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Book Review
Law And Tactics In Federal Criminal Cases. By Shadoan, et al.,
Coiner Publications, Ltd., Fairfax, Virginia, 1964. Pp. 317.
It is no mean task to undertake the defense of a criminal case.
Some help, however, is forthcoming. Law and Tactics in Federal
Criminal Cases not only shows counsel where to begin, but also how
to proceed, and, what is most important, why. The authors "have
tried to make the volume basic enough to be a guide to the novice and
so authoritative as to be a valued reference to the experienced.''
Without pretention (and perhaps unwittingly) they announce they
have prepared a handbook,2 but they do not try to hide the faults
inherent in it. Fortunately, they are not numerous.
Because its scope is very broad, the book quite often is superficial. For example, the discussion of the constitutional and interpretive problems in the difficult area of search and seizure may give
the reader the impression that a good starting point is presented
but not more. Also to set out in approximately sixty pages the method
of presenting "the insanity defense", including expositions on "Lay
Testimony to Establish the Defense of Insanity", "Expert Testimony"
(to do the same) and "Cross-Examination of Psychiatrist Called by
United States", is too great an achievement for this sort of book.
In several instances, the answers to problems facing counsel seem
too pat, too contrived, too simple. This is especially true of the author's
suggestions on "Fact Investigation". One gets the impression that
counsel need only follow certain standardized suggestions, and the
truth will burst upon him: obey the "Standard Steps in Investigating
Any Criminal Case" (beginning with "File of the Case" through
"Street Investigation"), consult the "Checklist For Investigation of
Common Crimes", look at the "Checklist For Investigating Various
Defenses", wrap up all prior work with "Accident Reports, Maps and
Weather Reports", and all is done. If the reader is impressed that some
lead, some angle, some new twist, must have been missed, it is because
the authors seems to have given him too tasteful a paregoric.
1. P. iii. Chief Judge Roszel C. Thomsen of the U.S. District Court in Maryland has recognized this need and has prepared a checklist for counsel appointed to
represent the indigent defendant. As a point for reference, Law and Tactics is
heavily laden with opinions of the District and Circuit Courts for the District of
Columbia, but there are many references to other courts' decisions, including, of
course, the Supreme Court's.
2. Forms are provided for use on such matters as the Motion to Suppress
Evidence, For Discovery and Inspection, For Issuance of a Subpoena Duces Tecum,
For Ordinary Subpoena, For Production of Documents and Objects, For Subpoena
to Testify, For Mental Examination, For Bill of Particulars, For Severance and
For Separate Trial.
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Ironically, the real virtues of this book lie in just such simplification. By following these suggestions, counsel will have gone a long
way toward the discovery of truth and the presentation of a defense
and by the seriatim listing of steps which should be taken, counsel is
alerted to the disturbing problems.
Discussing McDonald v. United States,3 which on the one hand,
gave one co-defendant standing to object to the invasion of the other
co-defendant's privacy if evidence obtained from such invasion "prejudiced" the objector, and Jones v. United States,4 which, on the other,
by dicta, repeated the "traditional dogma" (in the author's words)
that the objector "must have been a victim of a search or seizure, one
against whom the search was directed, as distinguished from one who
claims prejudice only through the use of evidence gathered as a consequence of a search or seizure directed against someone else," 5 the
authors state:
"So long as unlawfully obtained evidence may be used, the
police are encouraged to continue violations to secure such evidence.
The 'fruit of the poisonous tree' doctrine expressly recognizes this.
To deny the derivative standing concept would invite law enforcement officers to select one defendant to be a victim of unlawful
procedure in the hope that information would be gained from him
to convict others. The one defendant-victim could be allowed to
go free without indictment in order to snare his contemporaries.
Such a result is inconsistent with the purpose of suppressing any
unlawfully secured evidence, and one may agree with Mr. Justice
Holmes that 'such evidence shall not be used at all.'
"All the implications of this concept of derivative standing are
not yet clear. However, it seems reasonable that a defendant
with such standing should be permitted to join his co-defendant
in a pretrial motion to suppress, even when it is impossible to
predict before trial whether the evidence in question will be introduced against one or both defendants. A more serious question
is whether a defendant can invoke this kind of derivative standing
where the co-defendant with primary standing fails or refuses to
raise the suppression issue. Similarly, a critical question arises when
the potential co-defendant with standing is not even indicted."
The authors also disapprove of what they recognize as a tendency
to interpret Draper v. United States,7 and Jones v. United States,"
as meaning that "hearsay declarations alone are sufficient to establish
3. 335 U.S. 451 (1948).
4. 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
5. Id. at 261.
6. Pp. 40-41.
7. 358 U.S. 307 (1959), holding, in the authors' words, that an arrest without a
warrant is justified where the only information indicating that the defendant had
commited a crime was obtained from an informer.
8. 362 U.S. 257, at 269 (1960), holding, again in the authors' words, that a
warrant could issue upon the basis of hearsay "so long as substantial basis for crediting
the hearsay is presented."
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probable cause." 9 They suggest that the real issue is how much
corroboration is required and that:
"[S]everal elements are needed before hearsay may be the
primary basis of probable cause: (1) the officer who swears to
the affidavit must personally know the informant; (2) the officer
must be a member of a specialized squad and have sufficient
experience to be able to make an informed assessment of the
information; (3) the officer must swear that he personally believes
the information given; (4) the information given by the informant must have been given within a reasonable time before the
arrest; (5) the information given by the informant must relate to
particular facts; (6) the informant must have been found to be
reliable in his recent information; and (7) in addition, the officer
must personally corroborate some elements of the informant's tip
before an arrest may be made. Of all these factors, the reliability
of the informant is probably the most important and certainly
the most vulnerable to attack."1
But without knowledge of the informant, his reliability cannot be
attacked; to bring matters to a head, counsel should consider whether
the affiant, in applying for a warrant, may have misrepresented his
basis for seeking it; if misrepresentation can properly be alleged, counsel
then should move to suppress the evidence obtained by putting in
issue the reliability of the informant. This strategy would force the
government either to identify the informant or to claim privilege;
and even privilege must give way "where the disclosure of an informer's identity, or of the contents of his communication, is relevant
and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to a fair
determination of a cause ... ""
In another example the authors suggest that Rule 4112 entitles
the defendant to a pretrial hearing on a motion to suppress a confession.
"Since there is no distinction between tangible and intangible evidence
when secured in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the procedure
for suppressing both should be the same. Similarly, pretrial suppression should be equally available even though the ground for suppres9. P. 51.
10. Id.

11. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60-61 (1957).
12. Rule 41(e), F.R. Crim. P. reads:
(e) Motion for Return of Property and to Suppress Evidence. A person
aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure may move the district court for the
district in which the property was seized for the return of the property and to
suppress for use as evidence anything so obtained on the ground that (1) the
property was illegally seized without warrant, or (2) the warrant is insufficient
on its face, or (3) the property seized is not that described in the warrant, or (4)
there was not probable cause for believing the existence of the grounds on which
the warrant was issued, or (5) the warrant was illegally executed. The judge
shall receive evidence on any issue of fact necessary to the decision of the motion.
If the motion is granted the property shall be restored unless otherwise subject
to lawful detention and it shall not be admissible in evidence at any hearing or
trial. The motion to suppress evidence may also be made in the district where
the trial is to be had. The motion shall be made before trial or hearing unless
opportunity therefor did not exist or the defendant was not aware of the grounds
for the motion, but the court in its discretion may entertain the motion at the
trial or hearing.

1965]

BOOK REVIEW

sion is not a constitutional one."' 3 The advantages of pretrial suppression are obvious: greater discovery is effected, a sounder determination of the advisability of a guilty plea is made available, and it is in
the interests of efficient administration to dispose of a motion to suppress tangible items and oral statements simultaneously. If the motion
is not heard pretrial, prejudice can be avoided and the record preserved
if, at trial, counsel approaches the bench, asks for a ruling that the
prosecutor not mention the statement until its admissibility is determined, and, if the request is denied, move for mistrial, the motion
being founded on the prior objection.
It is when they turn to the inadequacy of discovery techniques
that the authors come to grips with what seems to be one of the most
unfair aspects of the defense of the accused. Unlike discovery in civil
cases, discovery in criminal cases under Rule 16 is confined to discovery
of (a) tangible objects in the government's possession which are (b)
necessary for the preparation of a defense. 4 There is no question of a
right of discovery; defense counsel must argue necessity, and, even
then, he is limited to discovering tangible objects, not, for example,
statements not reduced to writing or admissions. Moreover, say the
authors, discovery will be allowed only if the objects are not otherwise
available to the defendant.'" Furthermore, objects voluntarily given
to the government by third persons are beyond the scope of Rule 16,
even though they are material to the defense and otherwise unavailable
to the defendant, and, even then, the defendant must show the method
by which the government obtained possession.' 6 Obviously, however,
materiality to a defense often cannot be determined until the defendant
has been afforded the right to inspect such objects; the obstacles are
rendered even more formidable by circularity of reasoning.
Wider discovery than under Rule 16 is available under Rule
17(c),

17

enacted as a statutory implementation of the sixth amend-

ment and resting upon a liberal policy for the subpoenaed production,
inspection and use at trial of documents or other materials, admissible
13. P. 91.
14. Rule 16, F.R. Crim. P. reads:
Upon motion of a defendant at any time after the filing of the indictment or
information, the court may order the attorney for the government to permit
the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph designated books, papers, documents or tangible objects, obtained from or belonging to the defendant or obtained
from others by seizure or by process, upon a showing that the items sought may
be material to the preparation of his defense and that the request is reasonable.
The order shall specify the time, place and manner of making the inspection and
of taking the copies or photographs and may prescribe such terms and conditions
as are just.
15. P. 127, n. 10.
16. P. 130, nn.19-22, citing to the proposed amendment to Rule 16, which makes
"possession, custody or control" by the government the only criteria.
17. Rule 17(c), F.R. Crim. P. reads:
(c) For Production of Documentary Evidence and of Objects. A subpoena
may also command the person to whom it is directed to produce the books, papers,
documents or other objects designated therein. The court on motion made
promptly may quash or modify the subpoena if compliance would be unreasonable
or oppressive. The court may direct that books, papers, documents or objects
designated in the subpoena be produced before the court at a time prior to the
trial or prior to the time when they are to be offered in evidence and may upon
their production permit the books, papers, documents or objects or portions thereof
to be inspected by the parties and their attorneys.
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as evidence, obtained by the government by solicitation or voluntarily
handed over by third persons. The issuance of a subpoena, however,
is discretionary, and good cause often must be shown, including that
the documents are "evidentiary". In this connection the authors contend that impeachment materials, such as F.B.I. and police criminal
records, photographs and line-up sheets, are evidentiary."
The authors also note with approval a proposed amendment to
Rule 16 which would delete the present requirement that a defendant
have a possessory or proprietary interest in his confessions or admissions; the amendment specifically would entitle him to discover "written
or recorded statements or confessions". 19 They also argue that a defendant should be allowed to see his grand jury
testimony without first
20
showing a "compelling necessity" therefor.
Finally, the authors maintain that, in cases where there are
multiple defendants, counsel for any one of them should be allowed
to inquire whether one of them has made a statement, and, if there is
one, to require its production, even if not made by his client, to determine whether its admission would be prejudicial to his client and thus
whether a motion for severance should be made.2 '
The authors do not blanch at making arguments for greater protection of the defendant, and, in turn, for easing the job of defense
counsel by putting him more on a par with the prosecution. If there
is one thread pervading Law and Tactics, it is that parity is a necessity.
Granted, it is not expressed in these terms, but one is impressed with
defense counsel's onerous burdens, his need for assistance (available in
large doses in this book) and the inherent rightness of achieving parity.
H. Rutherford Turnbull III*
18.
19.
20.
21.
*
Editor,

P. 134.
P. 137.
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